I prove an envelope theorem with a converse: the envelope formula is equivalent to a first-order condition. Like Milgrom and Segal's (2002) envelope theorem, my result requires no structure on the choice set. I use the converse envelope theorem to extend to abstract outcomes the canonical result in mechanism design that any increasing allocation is implementable, and apply this to selling information. * I am grateful to Eddie Dekel, Alessandro Pavan and Bruno Strulovici for guidance and comments, to Gregorio Curello for invaluable conversations, and to Piotr Dworczak, Matteo Escudé, Benny Moldovanu, Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey and an audience at Northwestern for helpful comments and suggestions. 1 E.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, §M.L). et al. (1995, §M.L)).
Introduction
Envelope theorems are a key tool of economic theory, with important roles in consumer theory, mechanism design and dynamic optimisation. In blueprint form, an envelope theorem gives conditions under which optimal decisionmaking implies that the envelope formula holds.
In textbook accounts, 1 the envelope theorem is typically presented as a consequence of the first-order condition. The modern envelope theorem of Milgrom and Segal (2002) , however, applies in an abstract setting in which the first-order condition is typically not even well-defined. These authors therefore rejected the traditional intuition and developed a new one.
In this paper, I re-establish the intuitive link between the envelope formula and the first-order condition. I introduce an appropriate generalised firstorder condition that is well-defined in the abstract environment of Milgrom and Segal (2002) , then prove an envelope theorem with a converse: my generalised first-order condition is equivalent to the envelope formula.
The converse envelope theorem proves useful for mechanism design. I use it to establish that the implementability of all increasing allocations, a canonical result when outcomes are drawn from an interval of R, remains valid when outcomes are abstract. I apply this result to the problem of a monopolist selling information (distributions of posteriors).
Précis
The setting is simple: an agent chooses an action x from a set X to maximise f (x, t), where t ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter. The set X is abstract: no topological, linear or measurable structure is required. A decision rule is a map X : [0, 1] → X that assigns an action X(t) to each parameter t. The value function associated with a decision rule X is V X (t) := f (X(t), t).
The modern envelope theorem of Milgrom and Segal (2002) states that, under a regularity assumption on f , any optimal decision rule X induces an absolutely continuous value function V X which satisfies the envelope formula V X (t) = f 2 (X(t), t) for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
The familiar intuition is as follows. The derivative of the value V X is
where the first term is the indirect effect via the induced change in the optimal action, and the second term is the direct effect. Since X is optimal, it satisfies the first-order condition d dm f (X(t + m), t) m=0 = 0, which yields the envelope formula. Indeed, a decision rule X satisfies the envelope formula if and only if it satisfies the first-order condition for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
The trouble with this intuition is that since the action set X is abstract (with no linear or topological structure), the derivative d dm f (X(t + m), t) m=0 is ill-defined in general.
To restore the equivalence of the envelope formula and first-order condition, I first define a generalised first-order condition that is well-defined in the abstract environment. The outer first-order condition is the following 'integrated' variant of the classical first-order condition: = 0 for all r, t ∈ (0, 1). I then prove an envelope theorem with a converse: under a regularity assumption on f , a decision rule X satisfies the envelope formula if and only if it satisfies the outer first-order condition and induces an absolutely continuous value function V X . The 'only if' part is a novel converse envelope theorem.
In §3, I apply the converse envelope theorem to mechanism design. There is a single agent with preferences over physical outcomes y ∈ Y and payments p ∈ R. Her preferences are indexed in 'single-crossing' fashion by t ∈ [0, 1], and this taste parameter is privately known to her. A canonical result is that if Y is a interval of R, then all (and only) increasing physical allocations Y : [0, 1] → Y can be implemented incentive-compatibly by some payment schedule P : [0, 1] → R.
I use the converse envelope theorem to extend this result to a large class of partially ordered spaces Y of outcomes. The argument runs as follows: fix an increasing physical allocation Y : [0, 1] → Y. To implement it, choose a payment schedule P : [0, 1] → R to make the envelope formula hold. Then by the converse envelope theorem, the outer first-order condition is satisfied, which means intuitively that (Y, P ) is locally incentive-compatible. The single-crossing property of preferences ensures that this translates into global incentive-compatibility.
I apply this implementability theorem to study the problem of a monopolist who sells information. The result implies that any Blackwell-increasing information allocation is implementable. I argue further that if consumers can share their information with each other, then only Blackwell-increasing allocations are implementable. I employ this characterisation of implementability to substantially simplify the monopolist's revenue-maximisation problem.
Related literature
Envelope theorems entered economics through consumer theory (Hotelling, 1932; Roy, 1947; Shephard, 1953) , were systematised by Samuelson (1947) under 'classical' assumptions, and were developed in greater generality by e.g. Danskin (1966 Danskin ( , 1967 , Silberberg (1974) and Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) . Milgrom and Segal (2002) discovered that classical-type assumptions were extraneous, and proved an envelope theorem without them. Subsequent refinements were obtained by Morand, Reffett and Tarafdar (2015) and Clausen and Strub (2019) . 2 'Converse' envelope theorems are almost absent from this literature, but appear in textbook presentations (e.g. Mas-Colell
Our maintained assumption will be that the objective varies smoothly, and (uniformly) not too erratically, with the parameter.
Maintained assumptions. f (x, ·) is differentiable for every x ∈ X , and the family {f (x, ·)} x∈X is uniformly absolutely continuous.
Remark 1. An easy-to-check sufficient condition for uniform absolute continuity is as follows: f (x, ·) is absolutely continuous for each x ∈ X , and there is an ∈ L 1 such that |f 2 (x, t)| ≤ (t) for all x ∈ X and t ∈ (0, 1). (This is the assumption that Milgrom and Segal (2002) use in their envelope theorem.) An even stronger sufficient condition is that f 2 be bounded. Example 1. Let X = [0, 1] and f (x, t) = xt. The maintained assumptions are satisfied since f 2 (x, t) = x exists and is bounded.
A decision rule is a map X : [0, 1] → X that prescribes an action for each type. The payoff of type t from following decision rule X is denoted
Equivalently (by Lebesgue's fundamental theorem of calculus), the envelope formula is satisfied iff V X is absolutely continuous and V X (t) = f 2 (X(t), t) for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
A decision rule X is called optimal iff at every parameter t ∈ [0, 1], X(t) maximises f (·, t) on X . Milgrom and Segal's (2002) envelope theorem is as follows:
Modern envelope theorem. Under the maintained assumptions, if X is optimal, then it satisfies the envelope formula. This is actually a slight refinement of Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002) , as these authors impose the sufficient condition in Remark 1 rather than uniform absolute continuity. 6 The result follows from the main theorem ( §2.4), so no proof is necessary.
Example 1 (continued). The envelope formula requires that X(t)t = t 0 X for every t ∈ [0, 1], or equivalently X(t) = t −1 t 0 X for all t ∈ (0, 1]. Thus the decision rules that satisfy the envelope formula are precisely those that are constant on (0, 1]. This includes all optimal decision rules (which set X = 1 on (0, 1]), but also anti-optimal ones (which choose 0 on (0, 1]).
Example 2. Consider
Any constant decision rule X = k satisfies the envelope formula:
This includes the optimal and anti-optimal decision rules X = 1 and X = 0. The decision rule X(t) = t, which chooses a saddle point of f (·, t) for each t, also satisfies the envelope formula:
There are other decision rules that satisfy the envelope formula, e.g. X(t) = min{t, t } for t ∈ (0, 1).
Classical envelope theorem and converse
The textbook version of the envelope theorem, which has a natural and intuitive converse, holds under additional topological and convexity assumptions.
Classical assumptions. The action set X is a convex subset of R n , the action derivative f 1 exists and is bounded, and only Lipschitz continuous decision rules X are considered.
The classical assumptions are strong. Most glaringly, the Lipschitz condition rules out important decision rules in many applications. In the canonical auction setting, for instance, the revenue-maximising mechanism is discontinuous (Myerson, 1981) . 7 Example 1 (continued). X = [0, 1] is a convex subset of R, and f 1 (x, t) = t exists and is bounded. If we restrict attention to Lipschitz continuous decision rules X : [0, 1] → [0, 1], then the classical assumptions are satisfied.
Given a Lipschitz continuous decision rule X, suppose that type t considers taking the action X(t + m) intended for another type. The map m → f (X(t + m), t) is differentiable a.e. under the classical assumptions, 8 7 Even when the classical assumptions are relaxed as much as possible, unless f is trivial, X still has satisfy a strong continuity requirement. See appendix C. 8 Since f (·, t) is differentiable, and X is differentiable a.e. since it is Lipschitz continuous.
so we may define a first-order condition:
Definition 3. A decision rule X satisfies the first-order condition a.e. iff
= 0 for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
The first-order condition a.e. requires that almost no type t can do better (or worse) by choosing an action X(t + m) intended for a nearby type t + m. It does not say that there are no nearby actions that do better (or worse).
Classical envelope theorem and converse. Under the maintained and classical assumptions, a Lipschitz continuous decision rule satisfies the firstorder condition a.e. iff it satisfies the envelope formula.
Example 1 (continued). A Lipschitz continuous decision rule X is differentiable a.e., so satisfies the first-order condition at t ∈ (0, 1) iff
This requires that X be constant a.e. We saw that the envelope formula demands that X be constant on (0, 1]. For Lipschitz continuous decision rules X, both conditions are equivalent to constancy on all of [0, 1].
Proof of the classical envelope theorem and converse. Fix a Lipschitz continuous decision rule X : [0, 1] → X . By Lemma 2 in appendix C, V X (t) := f (X(t), t) is absolutely continuous, hence differentiable a.e. The map r → f (X(r), t) is differentiable a.e. by the classical assumptions, and t → f (X(r), t) is differentiable by the maintained assumptions. Hence the a.e.-defined derivative of V X obeys the differentiation identity
It follows that the first-order condition a.e. is equivalent to
which is in turn equivalent to the envelope formula since V X is absolutely continuous.
Example 2 (continued). The classical assumptions are satisfied provided we restrict attention to Lipschitz continuous decision rules. We saw that the constant and 'saddle' decision rules, which are Lipschitz continuous, satisfy the envelope formula. Let us verify that they also satisfy the first-order condition a.e., as the classical converse envelope theorem demands. For a constant decision rule X = k, the first-order condition holds (everywhere) on (0, 1) since d dm − 1 3 (k − t) 3 m=0 = 0. The 'saddle' decision rule X(t) = t satisfies the first-order condition on (0, 1) since
There are many decision rules that satisfy the first-order condition a.e. but violate the envelope formula: for example, step functions like X = 1 [t ,1] for t ∈ (0, 1]. The classical envelope theorem tells us that any such decision rule must fail to be Lipschitz continuous.
The outer first-order condition
Without the classical assumptions, the 'imitation derivative'
need not exist, in which case the first-order condition is ill-defined. To circumvent this problem, we require a novel first-order condition. = 0 for all r, t ∈ (0, 1).
As an intuitive motivation, suppose that types s ∈ [r, t] deviate by choosing X(s+m) rather than X(s). The aggregate payoff to such a deviation is t r f (X(s + m), s)ds, and the outer first-order condition says (loosely) that local deviations of this kind are collectively suboptimal.
Example 1 (continued). For any decision rule X that is a.e. constant at some k ∈ [0, 1], the outer first-order condition holds:
= 0 for all r, t ∈ (0, 1).
This includes many decision rules that fail to be Lipschitz continuous (or even continuous). In particular, it admits decision rules that are constant except at zero, which we argued satisfy the envelope formula (p. 6). Decision rules that are not constant a.e. violate the outer first-order condition.
As we shall see, the outer first-order condition is well-defined even when the classical assumptions fail. When they do hold, the outer first-order condition coincides with the first-order condition a.e.:
Housekeeping lemma. Under the maintained and classical assumptions, the outer first-order condition is equivalent to the first-order condition a.e.
Proof. Fix a Lipschitz continuous decision rule X : [0, 1] → X . By Lemma 2 in appendix C, the family
is convergent a.e. as m ↓ 0 and uniformly integrable. Hence by the Vitali convergence theorem, for any r, t ∈ (0, 1),
ds.
The left-hand side is zero for all r, t ∈ (0, 1) iff the outer first-order condition holds. The right-hand side is zero for all r, t ∈ (0, 1) iff the first-order condition a.e. holds. 9
The term 'outer' is inspired by this argument. By taking the differentiation operator outside the integral, we change nothing in the classical case, and ensure existence beyond the classical case.
Envelope theorem and converse
My main result characterises the envelope formula in terms of the outer first-order condition.
Envelope theorem and converse. Under the maintained assumptions, for a decision rule X : [0, 1] → X , the following are equivalent:
(1) X satisfies the outer first-order condition d dm t r f (X(s + m), s)ds m=0 = 0 for all r, t ∈ (0, 1), and V X (t) := f (X(t), t) is absolutely continuous.
(2) X satisfies the envelope formula
The implication (1) =⇒ (2) is an envelope theorem with weak assumptions; the modern envelope theorem in §2.1 and the classical envelope theorem in §2.2 are corollaries. 10 The implication (2) =⇒ (1) is the converse envelope theorem, which entails the classical converse envelope theorem in §2.2.
The absolute-continuity-of-V X condition in (1) ensures that f (X(·), t) does not behave too erratically near t. A characterisation of this property is provided in appendix B.
Example 1 (continued). We saw that a decision rule satisfies the envelope formula iff it is constant on (0, 1] (p. 6), and satisfies the outer first-order condition iff it is constant a.e. (p. 8). Thus the envelope formula implies the outer first-order condition. For the converse, observe that an a.e. constant X for which V X (t) = X(t)t is (absolutely) continuous must in fact be constant on (0, 1], though not necessarily at zero.
In the classical case, our proof relied on the differentiation identity
or (rearranged and integrated)
To pursue an analogous proof, we require an 'outer' version of this identity in which differentiation and integration are interchanged on the left-hand side. The following lemma does the job.
Identity lemma.
Under the maintained assumptions, if V X is absolutely continuous, then for all r, t ∈ (0, 1),
where both sides are well-defined.
10 Unlike the modern envelope theorem in §2.1, the hypotheses of the envelope theorem (1) =⇒ (2) (in particular, absolute continuity of VX ) can be difficult to check in practice.
Before proving the lemma, let us put it to use. The left-hand side of (I) is zero for all r, t ∈ (0, 1) iff the outer first-order condition holds. The right-hand side is zero for all r, t ∈ (0, 1) iff the envelope formula holds. 11 Therefore:
Proof of the envelope theorem and converse. Suppose that the outer firstorder condition holds and that V X is absolutely continuous. Then the identity lemma applies, so the outer first-order condition implies the envelope formula.
Suppose that the envelope formula holds. Then V X is absolutely continuous by Lebesgue's fundamental theorem of calculus. Hence the identity lemma applies, so the envelope formula implies the outer first-order condition.
To prove the identity lemma, we will use the results collected in appendix A: the AC-UI lemma of Fitzpatrick and Hunt (2015) , the Vitali convergence theorem, and Lebesgue's fundamental theorem of calculus.
Proof of the identity lemma. For t ∈ [0, 1) and m ∈ (0,
.
Fix r, t ∈ (0, 1). Note that lim m↓0 t r χ m = d dm t r f (X(s + m), s)ds m=0 whenever the limit exists. Our task is to show that { t r χ m } m>0 is convergent as m ↓ 0 with limit
{ψ m } m>0 need not converge a.e. under the maintained assumptions. 12 But where the bracketed terms vanish as m ↓ 0 because {ψ m } m>0 is uniformly integrable by the maintained assumptions. By absolute continuity of V X and the AC-UI lemma in appendix A, {φ m } m>0 is uniformly integrable and converges a.e. to V X as m ↓ 0. Since {ψ m } m>0 is uniformly integrable and converges pointwise to t → f 2 (X(t), t), it follows that
where the third equality holds by the Vitali convergence theorem. Since V X is absolutely continuous, Lebesgue's fundamental theorem of calculus implies that t
Because the right-hand side is well-defined by the maintained assumptions, this also shows that { t r χ m } m>0 is convergent as m ↓ 0.
Application to mechanism design
A key result in mechanism design is that, under a suitable 'single-crossing' assumption on the agent's preferences, all and only increasing allocations are implementable. While the 'only' part is straightforward, the 'all' part has substance. Existing theorems of this sort require that the physical outcome be drawn from an interval of R.
In this section, I use the converse envelope theorem to extend this result to abstract spaces of physical outcomes. After introducing the environment, I prove the implementability result and a partial converse. I then apply these to the sale of information by a monopolist.
Environment
There is a single agent 13 with preferences over physical outcomes y ∈ Y and payments p ∈ R represented by f (y, p, t). The preference parameter (type) t ∈ [0, 1] is privately known to the agent. The set Y of physical outcomes is a partially ordered set, not assumed to possess any topological, measurable or linear structure. We assume only that it satisfies:
Order assumptions. Y is order-dense-in-itself, countably chain-complete and chain-separable. 14 In words, Y is 'rich' (first two assumptions) and 'not too large' (final assumption). Many natural spaces enjoy these properties, including R n with the usual (product) order, the space of all integrable functions (random variables) on any measure (probability) space ordered by 'a.e. (a.s.) smaller', and the space of distributions of (posterior) beliefs (updated from a given prior) ordered by 'more informative than'. These assertions are proved in appendix D, where further examples are also given.
We maintain the following standard assumptions on the agent's utility f .
Preference assumptions. f (y, ·, t) is strictly decreasing and onto R for all y ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, 1]. The type derivative f 3 exists and is bounded. For every chain C ⊆ Y, f (·, ·, 0) is continuous on C × R and {f 3 (·, ·, t)} t∈[0,1] is equi-continuous on C × R when C is given the relative topology inherited from the order topology on Y. 15, 16 The existence and boundedness of the type derivative f 3 ensures that the maintained assumptions are satisfied when we embed this model in the 13 All of the analysis carries over to the case with multiple agents. 14 A set A partially ordered by is order-dense-in-itself iff for any a < a in A, there is
15 The order topology on Y is the one generated by the open order rays {y ∈ Y : y < y} and {y ∈ Y : y < y } for each y ∈ Y, where < denotes the strict part of the order on Y. 16 A detail: equi-continuity is a property of functions on a uniformisable topological space. Y × R need not be uniformisable under the order assumptions, which is why the equicontinuity hypothesis is formulated on chains instead. To see that C × R is uniformisable for any chain C ⊆ Y, we need only convince ourselves that the relative topology on C inherited from the order topology on Y is completely regular. This topology is obviously finer than the order topology on C, so it suffices to show that the latter is completely regular. And that is (a consequence of) a standard result; see e.g. Cater (2006) . general setting of §2.1 by letting X := Y × R. The converse envelope theorem is therefore applicable.
Remark 2. The preference assumptions imply that for any chain C ⊆ Y, f is (jointly) continuous on C × R × [0, 1] when C has the relative topology inherited from the order topology on Y. 17 Remark 3. A common special case is quasi-linear preferences f (y, p, t) = h(y, t) − p. As is well-known, quasi-linearity is a reasonable assumption if the agent spends a very small fraction of her budget on the physical outcome y, and not otherwise. We do not impose quasi-linearity.
In addition to the mild preference assumptions, we will employ an economically substantive 'single-crossing' hypothesis. To state it, we will require derivatives that are well-defined even for non-differentiable functions:
Writing for the partial order on Y, we call a map Y :
Definition 6. f satisfies the outer Spence-Mirrlees condition iff for any increasing Y : [0, 1] → Y and any P :
The outer Spence-Mirrlees condition formalises the idea that higher types are willing to pay more to increase y ∈ Y. It is the same in spirit as the classical Spence-Mirrlees assumption, which requires that the slope f 1 (y, p, t)/|f 2 (y, p, t)| of the agent's indifference curves be increasing in t for all (y, p) ∈ Y × R. Indeed, I show in appendix E that the outer Spence-Mirrlees condition is implied by the classical one whenever the latter is well-defined.
A direct mechanism is a pair of maps Y : [0, 1] → Y and P : [0, 1] → R that assign a physical outcome and a payment to each type. A direct mechanism (Y, P ) is called incentive-compatible iff no type strictly prefers the outcome-payment pair designated for another type:
By a revelation principle, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to incentive-compatible direct mechanisms. A physical allocation Y :
Increasing allocations are implementable
We shall show that when preferences satisfy the outer Spence-Mirrlees condition, any increasing allocation Y : [0, 1] → Y is implementable. Several results along these lines are known for the special case in which Y is an interval of R. 19 (As in auctions, where y ∈ Y = [0, 1] is the probability with which the agent gets the good.) With quasi-linear preferences f (y, p, t) = h(y, t) − p, the result has been known since Mirrlees (1976) and Spence (1974) . Under the classical assumptions, Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) proved the weaker claim that all increasing and piecewise continuously differentiable allocations are implementable. Nöldeke and Samuelson (2018) obtained the result without either quasi-linearity or the classical assumptions. Implementability theorem. Under the order and preference assumptions, if f satisfies the outer Spence-Mirrlees condition, then any increasing physical allocation is implementable.
It is instructive to compare the hypotheses to those of Nöldeke and Samuelson (2018, Proposition 13) . Whereas they assume that Y is a compact interval of R, I allow it to be any partially ordered set satisfying the order assumptions. On the other hand, I require the type derivative f 3 to exist, as this is a prerequisite for the envelope formula to be well-defined. (Their Spence-Mirrlees condition also differs from mine in form, though not in spirit.)
The proof is in appendix F. The idea is as follows. Take any increasing physical allocation Y : [0, 1] → Y. By the existence lemma in appendix F.1, there exists a payment schedule P : [0, 1] → R such that (Y, P ) satisfies the envelope formula. By the converse envelope theorem, it follows that (Y, P ) is locally incentive-compatible in the sense that it satisfies the outer first-order condition. The outer Spence-Mirrlees condition ensures that local incentive-compatibility translates into global incentive-compatibility.
The argument for the final step actually applies only to physical allocations Y that are suitably continuous. But the order assumptions ensure (via a lemma in appendix F.3) that any increasing Y can be approximated by a sequence of suitably continuous and increasing (hence implementable) physical allocations, and incentive-compatibility is preserved in the limit.
Implementable allocations are non-decreasing
To complete the picture of implementability, it remains to provide a partial converse to the implementability theorem. This result has little to do with the envelope theorem or its converse, so I shall be brief. Call a map π : Y → R that assigns a price to each physical outcome y ∈ Y a tariff.
Definition 7. f satisfies the strict Spence-Mirrlees condition iff for any tariff π : Y → R, the map (y, t) → f (y, π(y), t) is strictly single-crossing. 20
Letting denote the partial order on Y, we say that a physical allocation
Y (t ), or they could be incomparable. Increasing maps are nondecreasing, but the converse is false except if Y is a chain.
Proposition 1. If f (y, ·, t) is strictly decreasing for each y ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, 1], and f satisfies the strict Spence-Mirrlees condition, then only non-decreasing allocations are implementable.
The proof is in appendix G. Under the additional hypothesis that Y is a chain, Proposition 1 yields a full converse: only increasing allocations are implementable. Combined with the implementability theorem, this yields: Corollary 1. Under the order and preference assumptions, if f satisfies the outer and strict Spence-Mirrlees conditions and Y is a chain, then all and only increasing physical allocations are implementable.
Selling information
There is a population of consumers with types t ∈ [0, 1], a finite set Ω of states of the world, and a set A of actions. A type-t consumer earns payoff U (a, ω, t) if she takes action a ∈ A in state ω ∈ Ω, so her expected value at belief µ ∈ ∆(Ω) is
Assume that the type derivative V 2 exists and is bounded, and that V 2 (·, t) is continuous for each t ∈ [0, 1]. This is slightly stronger than assuming that the underlying type derivative U 3 has the same properties; 21 see e.g. Milgrom and Segal (2002, Theorem 3) for sufficient conditions.
A type-t consumer who makes payment p ∈ R suffers a cost C(p, t). We suppose that C(·, t) is continuous, strictly increasing and onto R, and that the type derivative C 2 exists and is bounded with
Consumers share a common prior µ 0 ∈ int ∆(Ω). Prior to making her decision, a consumer may be able to observe the realisation of a random variable that is correlated with ω (a signal), and thus to form a new (posterior) belief according to Bayes's rule. Since the signal is random, the agent's posterior is random; write y for its distribution. (y is a Borel probability measure on ∆(Ω).) Our agent's expected payoff under a signal that induces posterior distribution y, if she makes payment p ∈ R, is
It is well-known that a Borel probability measure on ∆(Ω) is the posterior distribution induced by some signal iff it is Bayes-plausible, i.e. its mean The preference assumptions are also satisfied: it is clear that f (y, ·, t) is strictly decreasing and onto R and that f 3 exists and is bounded, and I verify the continuity hypotheses in appendix H. Assume that V (·, t) is strictly convex, 24 so that information is valuable in the sense that y → ∆(Ω) V (µ, t)y(dµ) is strictly increasing. 25 Assume also that higher types have a higher willingness to pay-precisely, that f satisfies the outer and strict Spence-Mirrlees conditions. Example 3 (forecasting). Each agent ('consumer') is tasked with announcing a probabilistic forecast a ∈ A := ∆(Ω) of the state ω ∈ Ω. Ex post, the 22 The 'only if' direction is trivial. Conversely, for any a Bayes-plausible y ∈ Y, y is induced by a ∆(Ω)-valued signal whose distribution conditional on each ω ∈ Ω is
This construction is due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) , as is the term 'Bayes-plausible'. 23 The ⇒ direction follows from the fact that V (·, t) is continuous and convex no matter what A and U are. The converse is proved by showing that any continuous and convex v can be adequately approximated by V (·, t) for some A and U .
24 It is automatically convex; strictness requires that U (·, ·, t) be sufficiently variable. 25 The fact that strict convexity of v implies strict monotonicity of y → vdy is established in the proof of Proposition 3(d) in appendix D. It is a consequence of Jensen's inequality.
public's assessment of an agent's quality as a forecaster is some function of the forecast a and realised state ω (a scoring rule); for concreteness, a(ω)/ a , where · denotes the Euclidean norm. 26 Each agent attaches some importance t ∈ [0, 1] to being considered a good forecaster, so that U (a, ω, t) = ta(ω)/ a . Agents are expected-utility maximisers.
It is easily verified that an agent with belief µ ∈ ∆(Ω) optimally announces forecast a = µ. Her value is then
By inspection, V 2 (µ, t) = µ exists, is bounded, and is continuous and strictly convex in µ. 27 To complete the example, we may assume e.g. that C(p, t) = p k for some k > 0, so that
Clearly agents with a higher t have a higher willingness to pay for information, so the outer and strict Spence-Mirrlees assumptions are satisfied.
The principal can sell any signal; equivalently, any Bayes-plausible distribution y ∈ Y of posterior beliefs. An information allocation is a map Y : [0, 1] → Y that assigns a posterior distribution to each consumer. By the implementability theorem, every Blackwell-increasing information allocation is implementable by some mechanism. Proposition 1 tells us that only Blackwell-non-decreasing information allocations are implementable.
The gap cannot be closed: there exist implementable information allocations Y which are non-decreasing but not increasing. This means precisely that some consumer types t < t are allocated Blackwell-incomparable information. But any such information allocation is vulnerable to collusion, as consumers of types t and t would strictly benefit by sharing their information. 28
This possibility tightens incentive-compatibility. In particular, it rules out precisely those Y :
Let us call an information allocation sharing-proof iff its image is a chain.
Proposition 2. An information allocation is implementable and sharingproof if and only if it is increasing.
Proof. An increasing Y : [0, 1] → Y is implementable by the implementability theorem, and clearly sharing-proof.
Remark 4. Using Proposition 2, we may formulate the principal's revenuemaximisation problem as a choice between increasing allocations, as in Myerson (1981) . Assume that types t are distributed according to a CDF F . Each consumer's outside option is no information, meaning the y ∈ Y degenerate at the prior µ 0 ; normalise its value to zero for every type t. (Slightly) strengthen the strict monotonicity of C(·, t) to be uniform in the sense that for some M > 0, we have C(p , t) − C(p, t) ≥ M (p − p) for any p < p in R, y ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, 1], and strengthen the equi-continuity of {C(·, t)} t∈[0,1] to equi-Lipschitz continuity.
By Proposition 2, we may break the principal's problem into the inner problem of optimally implementing a given increasing Y and the outer problem of optimally choosing an increasing Y . The inner problem is, for a given increasing Y , The outer problem is to choose the information allocation:
Although this represents a simplification, the outer problem is not as tractable as in Myerson (1981) . First, unless we assume quasi-linearity, the dependence of P Y on Y cannot typically be expressed in closed form. 30 Second, since Y is not a chain, the constraint set is (much) larger.
Appendix to the theory ( §2) A Mathematical background
Two properties of functions are important in this paper. Firstly, we sometimes wish to write a function as the integral of its derivative. Secondly, we sometimes wish to interchange limits and integrals.
For the first property, Lebesgue's fundamental theorem of calculus states that a function equals the integral of its derivative iff it is absolutely continuous.
Definition 8. A function φ : [0, 1] → R is absolutely continuous iff for each ε > 0, there is δ > 0 such that for any finite collection {(r n , t n )} N n=1 of disjoint intervals of [0, 1],
Absolute continuity implies continuity and differentiability a.e., but the converse is false. Absolute continuity is implied by Lipschitz continuity.
Lebesgue's fundamental theorem of calculus. Let φ be a function [0, 1] → R. The following are equivalent:
(1) φ is absolutely continuous.
(2) φ is differentiable a.e., and
30 In general, all we can say is that PY is the unique solution P :
In the quasi-linear special case C(p, t) = p, the solution has the closed form
For the second property, the Vitali convergence theorem states that limits and integrals can be interchanged iff uniform integrability holds. (Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem is a corollary.)
Vitali convergence theorem. Let {φ n } n∈N be a sequence in L 1 converging a.e. to φ : [0, 1] → R. The following are equivalent:
(1) {φ n } n∈N is uniformly integrable.
(2) φ ∈ L 1 , and
Absolute continuity and uniform integrability are closely related. The following is due to Fitzpatrick and Hunt (2015) :
AC-UI lemma. Let φ be a continuous function [0, 1] → R. The following are equivalent:
(2) The family of 'divided difference' functions
is uniformly integrable.
B A characterisation of absolute continuity of the value
The following lemma characterises the absolute-continuity-of-V X condition that appears in the main theorem (p. 9). Apart from its independent interest, it is needed to prove Lemma 2 in appendix C.
Lemma 1.
Under the maintained assumptions, the following are equivalent:
(1) V X (t) := f (X(t), t) is absolutely continuous.
(2) The family {χ m } m>0 is uniformly integrable, where
In the classical case, (2) is imposed (it follows from the classical assumptions). In the modern case, (1) arises within the theorem. Both are clearly joint restrictions on f and X.
Proof. As in the proof of the identity lemma (p. 11), for t ∈ [0, 1) and
{ψ m } m>0 is uniformly integrable by the maintained assumption of uniform absolute continuity. By the AC-UI lemma in appendix A, (1) is equivalent to {φ m } m>0 being uniformly integrable. Suppose that {χ m } m>0 is uniformly integrable, and fix ε > 0. Let δ > 0 meet the ε/2-challenge for both {ψ m } m>0 and {χ m } m>0 ; then for any t ∈ [0, 1 − δ) and m > 0,
showing that {φ m } m>0 is uniformly integrable. An almost identical argument establishes that uniform integrability of {φ m } m>0 implies uniform integrability of {χ m } m>0 .
C Results under the classical assumptions
The following lemma is used in the proof of the classical envelope theorem and converse (p. 7).
Lemma 2. Fix a decision rule X : [0, 1] → X , and let
(1) Under the maintained and classical assumptions, {χ m } m>0 is uniformly integrable.
(2) Under the maintained assumptions, the following are equivalent:
(a) {χ m } m>0 is uniformly integrable and convergent a.e. as m ↓ 0.
exists for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
The proof of the classical envelope theorem and converse (p. 7) requires precisely absolute continuity of V X (so that the envelope formula can be satisfied) and the a.e. existence of d dm f (X(t + m), t)| m=0 (so that the firstorder condition a.e. is well-defined). Part (2) therefore tells us that the classical assumptions can be weakened to uniform integrability and a.e. convergence of {χ m } m>0 , and no further. For f non-trivial, the uniform integrability part involves a strong continuity requirement on X. 31
Proof. For (1), write L > 0 for the constant that bounds f 1 , and K > 0 for the Lipschitz constant of X. For any t ∈ [0, 1) and m ∈ (0, 1 − t], we have |χ m (t)| = 1 m X(t+m)
This shows that {χ m } m>0 is uniformly bounded, so a fortiori uniformly integrable.
For (2), absolute continuity of V X is equivalent to uniform integrability of {χ m } m>0 by Lemma 1 in appendix B, and a.e. existence of d dm f (X(t + m), t)| m=0 is definitionally equivalent to a.e. convergence of {χ m } m>0 .
Appendix to the application ( §3) D Some spaces that satisfy the order assumptions
Proposition 3. The following partially ordered sets satisfy the order assumptions (p. 13):
(a) R n equipped with the usual (product) order: (y 1 , . . . , y n ) (y 1 , . . . , y n ) iff y i ≤ y i for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(b) The space 1 of summable sequences equipped with the product order:
(c) For any measure space (Ω, F, µ), the space L 1 (Ω, F, µ) of (equivalence classes of a.e. equal) integrable functions Ω → R, equipped with the partial order defined by y y iff y ≤ y µ-a.e.
(Special case: for any probability space, the space of finite-expectation random variables, ordered by 'a.s. smaller'.) We will use the following sufficient condition for chain-separability. Lemma 3. If there is a strictly increasing function Y → R, then Y is chain-separable.
The converse is false: there are chain-separable spaces that admit no strictly increasing function.
Proof. Suppose that φ : Y → R is a strictly increasing function, and let Y ⊆ Y be a chain; we will show that Y has a countable order-dense subset. By inspection, the restriction φ| Y of φ to Y is an order-embedding of Y into R; thus Y is order-isomorphic to a subset of R (namely φ(Y ) ). The orderisomorphs of subsets of R are precisely those chains that have a countable order-dense subsets (see e.g. Theorem 24 in Birkhoff (1967, p. 200) ); thus Y has a countable order-dense subset.
Proof of Proposition 3(a)-(c). R n is exactly , . . . , n}, 2 {1,...,n} , c , where c is the counting measure; similarly, 1 is L 1 N, 2 N , c . It therefore suffices to establish (c).
So fix a measure space (Ω, F, µ), and let Y := L 1 (Ω, F, µ) be ordered by 'µ-a.e. smaller'. Y is order-dense-in-itself since if y ≤ y µ-a.e. and y < y on a set of positive µ-measure, then y := (y + y )/2 lives in Y and satisfies y ≤ y ≤ y µ-a.e. and y < y < y on a set of positive µ-measure.
For countable-chain completeness, take any countable chain Y ⊆ Y, and suppose that it has a lower bound y ∈ Y; we will show that Y has an infimum. (The argument for upper bounds is symmetric.) Define y : Ω → R by y (ω) := inf y∈Y y(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω; it is well-defined (i.e. it maps into R, with the possible exception of a µ-null set) since Y has a lower bound. Clearly y ≤ y ≤ y µ-a.e. for any lower bound y of Y and any y ∈ Y , so it remains only to show that y lives in Y, meaning that it is measurable and that its integral is finite. Measurability obtains since Y is countable (e.g. Proposition 2.7 in Folland (1999) ). As for the integral, since y ≤ y ≤ y 0 µ-a.e. and y and y 0 are integrable (live in Y), we have Observe that φ is strictly increasing: if y ≤ y µ-a.e. and y = y on a set of positive µ-measure, then φ(y) < φ(y ). Chain-separability follows by Lemma 3. 
For countable chain-completeness, let Y ⊆ Y be a countable chain with an upper bound in Y; we will show that it has a supremum. (The argument for infima is analogous.) This is trivial if Y has a maximum element, so suppose not. Then there is a strictly increasing sequence (y n ) n∈N in Y that has no upper bound in Y . 33 This sequence is trivially tight since ∆(Ω) is a compact metric space, so has a weakly convergent subsequence (y n k ) k∈N by Prokhorov's theorem; 34 call the limit y . Thus by the monotone convergence theorem for real numbers and the definition of weak convergence, we have for every for every continuous (hence bounded) and convex v :
vdy which is to say that y is the supremum of Y .
For chain-separability, it suffices by Lemma 3 to identify a strictly increasing function Y → R. Let v be any strictly convex function ∆(Ω) → R, and define φ : Y → R by φ(y) := ∆(Ω) vdy. Take y < y in Y; we must show that φ(y) < φ(y ). By a standard embedding theorem (e.g. Theorem 7.A.1 in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) ), there exists a probability space on which there are random vectors X, X with respective laws y, y such that E(X |X) = X a.s. and X = X with positive probability. Thus Proof of Proposition 3(e). The argument is similar to that for R 2 . Write Y for the open intervals of (0, 1).
is an open interval (lives in Y) and satisfies (a, b) (a , b ) (a , b ) . 33 That is, yn < yn+1 for every n ∈ N, and for any y ∈ Y we have y < yn for some n ∈ N. 34 E.g. Theorem 5.1 in Billingsley (1999) .
For countable chain-completeness, we must show that every countable chain has an infimum and supremum. So take a (countable) chain Y ⊆ Y, φ is clearly strictly increasing, giving us chain-separability by Lemma 3.
E The classical and outer Spence-Mirrlees conditions
The outer Spence-Mirrlees condition is implied by the classical Spence-Mirrlees condition whenever the latter is well-defined: Assume that the classical Spence-Mirrlees condition holds, and compute for n ∈ [0, 1 − t] (where all derivatives are defined a.e.)
The ratio is increasing in n by the classical Spence-Mirrlees condition, and Y ≥ 0 since Y is increasing. It follows that U 1 (s, ·) is 'single-crossing' in the sense that for n >(<) n, U 1 (s, s + n) ≥(≤) 0 implies U 1 (s, s + n ) ≥(≤) 0.
To establish the first part of the outer Spence-Mirrlees condition (the proof of the second is analogous), fix r < t in (0, 1), and assume the hypothesis:
This is equivalent to U 1 (s, s) ≥ 0 for a.e. s ∈ [r, t]. By the 'single-crossing' property of U 1 (s, ·), it follows that U 1 (s, s + n) ≥ 0 for a.e. s ∈ [r, t] and every n ∈ (0, 1 − t]. Equivalently, for every n ∈ (0, 1 − t],
F Proof of the implementability theorem (p. 16)
The proof relies on three lemmata. We state and prove these in turn in §F.1-F.3, then prove the theorem in §F.4.
F.1 Solutions of the envelope formula
This appendix provides conditions for the existence and uniqueness of solutions of the envelope formula. Existence is required in step 1 of the proof of the implementability theorem, where we are given a physical allocation Y and seek a payment schedule P such that (Y, P ) satisfies the envelope formula. Uniqueness is used in Remark 4 in §3.4.
Existence lemma. Assume that for all (y, t) ∈ Y × [0, 1], f (y, ·, t) is strictly decreasing, continuous and onto R. Further assume that the type derivative f 3 exists and is bounded, and that f 3 (y, ·, t) is continuous for all (y, t) ∈ Y ×[0, 1]. Then for any k ∈ R and any physical allocation Y : p, t) are Borel-measurable for every p ∈ R, there exists a payment schedule P : [0, 1] → R such that (Y, P ) satisfies the envelope formula with V Y,P (0) = k.
Remark 5. The following corollary may prove useful elsewhere: suppose in addition that Y is equipped with some topology such that f (·, p, t) and f 3 (·, p, t) are Borel-measurable and f 3 (y, p, ·) is continuous. Then for any Borel-measurable physical allocation Y : [0, 1] → Y, there is a payment schedule P such that (Y, P ) satisfies the envelope formula.
The existence lemma is immediate from the following abstract result by letting φ(p, t) := f (Y (t), p, t) and ψ(p, t) := f 3 (Y (t), p, t) .
Lemma 4. Let φ and ψ be functions R × [0, 1] → R. Suppose that φ(·, t) is strictly decreasing, continuous, and onto R for every t ∈ [0, 1], and that ψ is bounded with ψ(·, t) continuous for every t ∈ [0, 1]. Further assume that φ(p, ·) and ψ(p, ·) are Borel-measurable for each p ∈ R. Then for any k ∈ R, there is a function P :
Proof. Since φ(·, t) is strictly decreasing and continuous, it possesses a continuous inverse φ −1 (·, t), well-defined on all of R since φ(R, t) = R. We may therefore define a function χ : R × [0, 1] → R by
χ(·, t) is continuous since ψ(·, t) and φ −1 (·, t) are, χ is bounded since ψ is, and χ(w, ·) is Borel-measurable since ψ(·, t) is continuous and ψ(p, ·) and φ −1 (w, ·) are Borel-measurable. 35 Fix k ∈ R. Consider the integral equation
where W is an unknown function [0, 1] → R. Since χ(·, t) is continuous and χ(w, ·) bounded and Borel-measurable, there is a local solution by Carathéodory's existence theorem; 36 call it V . By boundedness of χ and a comparison theorem, 37 V can be extended to a solution on all of [0, 1]. Now define P (t) := φ −1 (V (t), t). For every t ∈ [0, 1], it satisfies
Uniqueness corollary. Under the hypotheses of the existence lemma, if in addition {f 3 (y, ·, t)} (y,t)∈Y×[0,1] is equi-Lipschitz continuous and the monotonicity of f (y, ·, t) is uniform in the sense that for some M > 0, we have
The claim that φ −1 (w, ·) is Borel-measurable for each w ∈ R is equivalent to the assertion that {t ∈ [0, 1] : φ −1 (w, t) > p} = {t ∈ [0, 1] : φ(p, t) > w} is a Borel set for any p, w ∈ R. And it is, since φ(p, ·) is Borel-measurable for each p ∈ R.
36 See e.g. Theorem 5.1 in Hale (1980, ch. 1) . 37 See e.g. Theorem 2.17 in Teschl (2012) .
then there is for each k ∈ R exactly one payment schedule such that (Y, P ) satisfies the envelope formula with V Y,P (0) = k.
Proof. Return to the proof of the existence lemma. The additional assumptions ensure, respectively, that {ψ(·, t)} t∈ [0, 1] and {φ −1 (·, t)} t∈ [0, 1] are equi-Lipschitz continuous. In follows that {χ(·, t)} t∈[0,1] is equi-Lipschitz continuous, which ensures uniqueness. 38
F.2 Monotonicity from derivatives
The following relationship between monotonicity and upper/lower derivatives is used in the proof of the implementability theorem:
This follows from a standard property of Dini derivatives-see e.g. Theorem 1.14 in Giorgi and Komlósi (1992) .
F.3 Continuous approximation of increasing maps
The second step in the proof of the implementability theorem relies on approximating an increasing map [0, 1] → Y with continuous and increasing maps. This is made possible by the following:
Approximation lemma. Let Y satisfy the order assumptions, and let Y be an increasing map [0, 1] → Y. The image Y ([0, 1]) may be embedded in a chain C ⊆ Y with inf C = Y (0) and sup C = Y (1) that is order-densein-itself, order-complete and order-separable. 39 Furthermore, there exists a sequence (Y n ) n∈N of maps [0, 1] → C converging pointwise to Y , each of which coincides with Y on {0, 1}, is increasing, and is continuous when C has the relative topology inherited from the order topology on Y.
The proof is rather long.
is a singleton, so suppose not.
We will first show (steps 1-3) that Y ([0, 1]) may be embedded in a chain C ⊆ Y with inf C = Y (0) and sup C = Y (1) that is order-dense-in-itself, order-complete and order-separable. We will then argue (step 4) that this chain C is order-isomorphic and homeomorphic to the unit interval, allowing us to treat Y as a function [0, 1] → [0, 1].
Step 1: construction of C. Write for the partial order on Y. Define Y to be the set of all outcomes y ∈ Y that are -comparable to every y ∈ Y ([0, 1]) and that satisfy Y (0) y Y (1). We claim that Y is order-dense-in-itself. Suppose to the contrary that there are y < y in Y for which no y ∈ Y satisfies y < y < y . Observe that by definition of Y , any x ∈ Y ([0, 1]) must be comparable to both y and y , so that
Since it is order-dense-in-itself, the grand space Y does contain an outcome y such that y < y < y . Since is transitive (being a partial order), it follows that y is comparable to every element of
But then y lies in Y by definition of the latter-a contradiction. Clearly Y (1) is an upper bound of any chain in Y . It follows by the Hausdorff maximality principle (which is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice) that there is a chain C ⊆ Y that is maximal with respect to set inclusion. (That is, C ∪ {y} fails to be a chain for every y ∈ Y \ C.)
Step 2: easy properties of C. By definition of Y , any maximal chain in Y (in particular, C) contains Y ([0, 1]) and has infimum Y (0) and supremum Y (1).
To see that C is order-dense-in-itself, assume toward a contradiction that there are c < c for which no c ∈ C satisfies c < c < c , so that (since C is a chain)
Because Y is order-dense-in-itself, there is a y ∈ Y \ C with c < y < c . It follows by transitivity of that y is comparable to every element of
But then C ∪ {y } is a chain in Y , contradicting the maximality of C.
To establish that C is order-separable, we must find a countable orderdense subset of C. Because the grand space Y is chain-separable, it contains a countable set K that is order-dense in C. Since C is a chain contained in
we may assume without loss of generality that every k ∈ K satisfies Y (0) k Y (1) and is comparable to every element of C. It follows that K is contained in Y (by definition of the latter). We claim that K is contained in C. Suppose to the contrary that there is a k ∈ K that does not lie in C; then C ∪ {k} is a chain in Y , which is absurd since C is maximal.
Step 3: order-completeness of C. Since every subset of C has a lower and an upper bound (viz. Y (0) and Y (1), respectively), what must be shown is that every subset of the chain C has an infimum and a supremum in C. To that end, take any subset C of C, necessarily a chain.
We will first (step 3(a)) show that if inf C exists in Y, then it must lie in C. We will then (step 3(b)) construct a countable chain C ⊆ C , for which inf C exists in Y by countable-chain completeness of Y, and show that it is also the infimum in Y of C . We omit the analogous arguments for sup C .
Step 3(a): inf C ∈ C if the former exists in Y. Suppose that inf C exists in Y. We claim that it lies in Y , meaning that Y (0) inf C Y (1) and that inf C is comparable to every y ∈ Y ([0, 1]). The former condition is clearly satisfied. For the latter, since inf C is a lower bound of C , transitivity of ensures that it is comparable to every y ∈ Y ([0, 1]) such that c y for some c ∈ C . To see that inf C is also comparable to every y ∈ Y ([0, 1]) with y < c for every c ∈ C , note that any such y is a lower bound of C . Since inf C is the greatest lower bound, we must have y inf C , showing that inf C is comparable to y. Now to show that inf C lies in C, decompose the chain C as
Clearly inf C is comparable to every element of C, and we showed that it lies in Y . Thus C ∪ {inf C } is a chain in Y , which by maximality of C requires that inf C ∈ C.
Step 3(b): inf C exists in Y. By essentially the same construction as we used to embed Y ([0, 1]) in Y in step 1, C may be embedded in a chain C ⊆ C that is order-dense-in-itself such that for every c ∈ C , we have c 0 c c 1 for some c 0 , c 1 ∈ C . By order-separability of C, C has a countable order-dense subset C , necessarily a chain. By countable chaincompleteness of Y, inf C exists in Y. We will show that it is the greatest lower bound of C .
Observe that inf C is a lower bound of C since C is order-dense in C . There can be no greater lower bound of C since C ⊆ C . Thus inf C exists in Y and equals inf C .
Since inf C is a lower bound of C ⊇ C , it is a lower bound of C . On the other hand, by construction of C , we may find for every c ∈ C a c ∈ C such that c c , so there cannot be a greater lower bound of C . Thus inf C is the greatest lower bound of C in Y.
Step 4: identification of C with [0, 1]. Since C is an order-separable chain, it is order-isomorphic to a subset S of R (see e.g. Theorem 24 in Birkhoff (1967, p. 200) ). It follows that C with the order topology is homeomorphic to S with its order topology.
The set S is dense in an interval S ⊇ S since S is order-dense-in-itself (because C is). The interval S must be closed and bounded since it contains its infimum and supremum (because C contains Y (0) and Y (1)). Since S is order-complete (because C is), it must coincide with its closure, so that S = S. Finally, S is non-trivial since C is neither empty nor a singleton. In sum, we may identify C with a non-trivial closed and bounded interval of R-without loss of generality, the unit interval [0, 1].
We may therefore treat Y as an increasing function [0, 1] → [0, 1]. With this simplification, it is straightforward to construct a sequence (Y n ) n∈N with the desired properties; we omit the details. 40
F.4 Proof of the implementability theorem (p. 16)
Fix an increasing Y : [0, 1] → Y. Embed its image Y ([0, 1]) in the chain C ⊆ Y delivered by the approximation lemma in appendix F.3, and equip C with the relative topology inherited from the order topology on Y. We henceforth view Y as a function [0, 1] → C, and (with a minor abuse of notation) view f and f 3 as functions C × R × [0, 1] → R.
We seek a payment schedule P : [0, 1] → R such that the direct mechanism (Y, P ) is incentive-compatible. We do this first (step 1) under the assumption that Y is continuous, then (step 2) show how continuity may be dropped.
Step 1: Suppose that Y is continuous. By the preference assumptions and the existence lemma in the appendix F.1, 41 there exists a transfer schedule 40 A detailed and readable construction can be found in Cordeiro (2016) . 41 The first two sets of hypotheses in existence lemma are implied by the preference assumptions. The measurability condition is satisfied because f (·, p, t), f3 (·, p, t) and Y are continuous, and f (y, p, ·) and f3(y, p, ·) are Borel-measurable (the former being continuous, and the latter a derivative). (To complete the argument for measurability, deduce that r → f (Y (r), p, t) is continuous and that t → f (Y (r), p, t) is Borel-measurable, so that (r, t) → f (Y (r), p, t) is (jointly) Borel-measurable, and thus t → f (Y (t), p, t) is Borelmeasurable. Similarly for f3.)
The continuity of Y , P and f implies that U (·, t) is continuous for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, the continuity of Y and P and the equi-continuity of {f 3 (·, ·, t)} t∈ [0, 1] imply that {U 2 (·, t)} t∈[0,1] is equi-continuous, and thus that φ r,t is continuous for any r < t in [0, 1]. 43 Now fix r < t in (0, 1). Since φ r,t is continuous and satisfies D φ r,t ≥ 0 on [−r, 0], it is increasing on [−r, 0] by the monotonicity lemma in appendix F.2. A similar argument shows that it is decreasing on [0, 1 − t].
It follows that for any r < t in [0, 1] and m ∈ [−r, 1 − t], Equivalently, U (t, t) ≥ U (r, t) for all r, t ∈ [0, 1], which is to say that (Y, P ) is incentive-compatible.
43 Fix ε > 0; we seek a δ > 0 such that |m − m| < δ implies |φr,t(m ) − φr,t(m)| < ε. Define ε1 := ε/2(t − r) > 0 and ε2 := ε/(t 2 − r 2 ) > 0. Since U (·, 0) is continuous on a compact domain, it is uniformly continuous by the Heine-Cantor theorem (e.g. Theorem 4.19 in Rudin (1976) )-thus we may find a δ1 > 0 such that |m − m| < δ1 implies |U (s + m , 0) − U (s + m, 0)| < ε1, uniformly over s ∈ [r, t] . A small variation on the same theorem yields that the equi-continuity of {U2(·, s )} s ∈[0,1] is uniform, so that we may choose δ2 > 0 to ensure that |m − m| < δ2 implies 
Step 2: Now drop the assumption that Y is continuous. By the order assumptions and the approximation lemma in appendix F.3, there exists a sequence (Y n ) n∈N of continuous and increasing maps [0, 1] → C converging pointwise to Y , each of which satisfies Y n = Y on {0, 1}. At each n ∈ N, by the previous argument, we may find a continuous P n : [0, 1] → R such that (Y n , P n ) satisfies the envelope formula with
It is obvious from incentive-compatibility that each P n must be increasing. Moreover, by the envelope formula, each P n takes values in the compact interval p 0 , p 1 , where p 0 and p 1 are defined by
and p 1 is well-defined since f 3 is bounded. Thus by the Helly selection theorem, 44 there is a subsequence of (P n ) n∈N that converges pointwise to some (increasing) P : [0, 1] → R.
Along that subsequence, (U n ) n∈N converges pointwise to the function U (r, t) := f (Y (r), P (r), t) since f is continuous. Because the incentivecompatibility inequalities are satisfied by each U n , they are satisfied in the limit: U (t, t) ≥ U (r, t) for all r, t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus (Y, P ) is an incentivecompatible direct mechanism.
G Proof of Proposition 1 (p. 17)
The proof relies on a simple 'non-decreasing' comparative statics lemma. Results along these lines are dimly known in the comparative statics literature, but rarely seen in print. 45 Lemma 5. Let X and T be partially ordered sets, and let f be a function X × T → R. Call a decision rule X : T → X optimal iff f (X(t), t) ≥ f (x, t) for all x ∈ X and t ∈ T .
If f is strictly single-crossing, then every optimal decision rule is nondecreasing.
44 See e.g. Rudin (1976, p. 167) . 45 An exception is Quah and Strulovici (2007, Proposition 5). Proof. Write and , respectively, for the partial orders on X and on T . Let X : T → X be optimal, and suppose toward a contradiction that there are t ≺ t in T such that X(t ) < X(t). Since X(t) is optimal at parameter t, we have f (X(t ), t) ≤ f (X(t), t). Because t ≺ t and X(t ) ≺ X(t), it follows by strict single-crossing that f (X(t ), t ) < f (X(t), t ), a contradiction with the optimality of X(t ) at parameter t .
Proof of Proposition 1. Let Y : [0, 1] → Y be implementable, so that (Y, P ) is incentive-compatible for some payment schedule P : [0, 1] → R. Define a tariff π : Y ([0, 1]) → R by π • Y = P ; it is well-defined because by incentive-compatibility and strict monotonicity of f (y, ·, t), Y (r) = Y (r ) implies P (r) = P (r ). Define a function φ : Y ([0, 1]) × [0, 1] → R by φ(y, t) := f (y, π(y), t). Take any t ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ Y ([0, 1]), and observe that there must be an r ∈ [0, 1] with Y (r) = y. Thus since (Y, P ) is incentive-compatible, we have φ(Y (t), t) = f (Y (t), π(Y (t)), t) = f (Y (t), P (t), t) ≥ f (Y (r), P (r), t) = f (y, π(y), t) = φ(y, t).
Since y ∈ Y ([0, 1]) and t ∈ [0, 1] were arbitrary, this shows that Y is an optimal decision rule for objective φ. Since φ is strictly single-crossing by the strict Spence-Mirrlees condition, it follows by Lemma 5 that Y is nondecreasing.
H The preference assumptions in selling information ( §3.4)
In this appendix, we show that the continuity hypotheses in the preference assumptions are satisfied in §3.4. We require two lemmata. Lemma 6. Let Y be the set of Borel probability distributions with mean µ 0 , equipped with the Blackwell informativeness order (as in §3.4). Give Y the order topology, and let C ⊆ Y be a chain. If a sequence (y n ) n∈N in C converges to y ∈ C in the relative topology on C, then (d is in fact a metric on Y.) Let (y n ) n∈N be a sequence in C that converges to some y ∈ C in the relative topology on C inherited from the order topology on Y; we will show that d(y n , y) vanishes as n − → ∞. It suffices to show that for every ε > 0, there is an open order interval I ε ⊆ Y such that y ∈ I ε ⊆ B ε . For then given any ε > 0, we know that y n lies in I ε ∩ C ⊆ B ε for all sufficiently large n ∈ N because (in the relative topology on C) I ε ∩ C is an open set containing y and y n − → y. And this clearly implies that d(y n , y) vanishes as n − → ∞.
So fix an ε > 0; we will construct an open order interval I ⊆ Y such that y ∈ I ⊆ B ε . There are three cases.
Case 1: y < y for no y ∈ Y. Let y ++ ∈ Y be such that y < y ++ . Define 
Case 2: y < y for no y ∈ Y. This case is analogous to the first: choose a y −− ∈ Y such that y −− < y, let y − := (1 − ε/2)y + (ε/2)y −− , and take I := y ∈ Y : y − < y .
The same arguments as in Case 1 yield y ∈ I ⊆ B ε .
Case 3: y < y < y for some y , y ∈ Y. Define y + as in Case 1 and y − as in Case 2, and let I := y ∈ Y : y − < y < y + .
We have y ∈ I ⊆ B ε by the same arguments as in Cases 1 and 2. Proof. Write W for the space of functions ∆(Ω) → R that can be written as the difference of continuous convex functions. Since the sum of convex functions is convex, W is a vector space. It is furthermore closed under pointwise multiplication (Hartman, 1959, p. 708) , and thus an algebra. Clearly W contains the constant functions, and it separates points in the sense that for any distinct µ, µ ∈ ∆(Ω) there is a w ∈ W with w(µ) = w(µ ). It follows by the Stone-Weierstrass theorem 46 that W is dense in the space of continuous functions ∆(Ω) → R when the latter has the sup metric, which is what we wished to prove.
With the lemmata in hand, we can establish the continuity hypotheses.
Proposition 5. Consider the setting in §3.4. Let C ⊆ Y be a chain, and equip it with the relative topology inherited from the order topology on Y. Then f (·, ·, 0) is continuous on C × R, and {f 3 (·, ·, t)} t∈[0,1] is equi-continuous on C × R.
Proof. Clearly f (y, ·, 0) is continuous and {f 3 (y, ·, t)} t∈[0,1] is equi-continuous for any y ∈ Y. Since f (y, p, t) is additively separable in y and p, it remains only to show that for any p ∈ R and any chain C ⊆ Y, f (·, p, 0) is continuous on C and {f 3 (·, p, t)} t∈[0,1] is equi-continuous on C.
To that end, fix a p ∈ R and a chain C ⊆ Y, and take a sequence (y n ) n∈N in C converging to some y ∈ C in the relative topology on C induced by the order topology on Y; we must show that |f (y n , p, 0) − f (y, p, 0)| and sup t∈ [0, 1] |f 3 (y n , p, t) − f 3 (y, p, t)| both vanish as n − → ∞. The former is easy: since V (·, 0) is continuous (hence bounded) and convex, we have for every n ∈ N, and the right-hand side vanishes as n − → ∞ by Corollary 2. For the latter, fix an ε > 0; we seek an N ∈ N such that |f 3 (y n , p, t) − f 3 (y, p, t)| < ε for all t ∈ [0, 1] and n ≥ N .
For each t ∈ [0, 1], since V 2 (·, t) is continuous, Lemma 7 permits us to choose continuous and convex functions w + t , w − t : ∆(Ω) → R such that w t := w + t − w − t is uniformly ε/3-close to V 2 (·, t). Write K for the constant bounding V 2 , and observe that {w t } t∈[0,1] is uniformly bounded by K := K + ε/3. By Lemma 6, there is an N ∈ N such that 
